Introduction
At
the outset of the last century, Israeli culture was “imagined” as an
ethno-national culture. That is, it assumed common premordial
roots that allegedly bind all Jewish communities every where in the world and
throughout history. As Ben-Zion Dinur, a prominent
and leading Zionist historiographer, had argued, “Jewish history is unified by an homogenous unity that encompasses all eras and all
places, reflecting upon each other”.[1][1] Accordingly, concentrated efforts had been directed
to produce the symbolic repertoire embodying it. The purpose was to employ this
repertoire in cultivating a culturally homogenized collective that blurs the
boundaries between state and society, people and land and Jewishness
and Israeliness. Given this strict ethno-national
grammar, there emerged a mutation in Israeli national identity manifested
through a series of negations: negation of Diaspora, negation of Arabic culture
and negation of religion. That is, while
officially and even vehemently negating these elements, Israeli national
identity derives – one way or another – some of its basic symbols and values
from them.
The early 1990 signify the
beginning of a pronounced change in this cultural and political reality. It
seems that there emerged a combination of centrifugal forces that present a
real challenge to the hegemonic national culture. The role models of Israeli
national culture become ever diversified and the possibility to break loose
from the firm grip of this culture is rendered tangibly real. Parallel to this
change, it was often possible to hear demands made by many sectors of Israeli
society that it should incorporate multicultural principles in its “basic
structure”. This reality presents, then, what can be described as “the
multicultural condition”. That is, it is a reality in which difference and
diversity receive growing legitimacy.
This vigorously emerging reality raises several questions. How should
the demand that
The purpose of this paper is to
examine possible answers to these questions. The paper divides into two main
sections. In the first section I will embark on a short theoretical discussion
concerning the relationship between claims of recognition and claims of
distribution. One of the main arguments of the paper is that one cannot
separate claims of recognition from claims of distribution. These claims are inextricable. This
argument, however, will be developed against the examination of the main
schisms characterizing Israeli society: Israeli Palestinians and Israeli Jews, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews, religious and non-religious,
veteran and immigrants and gender relations. This examination leads to the
conclusion that claims of distribution cannot be accommodated by a social
system or a theory of justice purporting to secure equality to all
members of society irrespective of race, gender and cultural differences.
This conclusion is valid either for societies whose basic political principles
claim cultural neutrality towards their members or societies whose principles
forfeit such neutrality but promise universal inclusion of them.
1. Multiculturalism: Between Recognition and Distributive Justice
Multicultural
politics is designed to address social practices that involve misrecognition or
negative labeling of certain groups in society. But there are controversies
among supporters of multiculturalism as to the operative conclusions and steps
that ought to be embarked upon when addressing these practices. Should
collective identities be politicized? It is possible to identify two main
approaches in this regard: a non-multicultural, minimalist approach and a
multicultural, maximal approach.
The minimalist approach is the one maintaining that
political efforts should be made to lift all obstacles preventing individuals
from integrating as full and equal members in society. Nancy Fraser, for instance,
gives a systematic expression to this approach.[2][2] Fraser states that misrecognition indeed constitutes
a form of institutional inferiority, and therefore it severely violates the
principles of justice. But the demand for recognition, she argues, should not
be viewed as a demand to fortify group identity but to overcome the inferior
status in which members of a cultural group – either ascribed or constructed –
are confined. “Misrecognition,” says Fraser, “does not
mean the depreciation and deformation of group identity. Rather, it means
social subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating as a
peer in social life”.[3][3] Fraser distinguishes then between two models derived
from the politics of recognition: an identity model and a status
model. She, however, rejects the former and espouses the latter.
The identity model, says Fraser, should be rejected
for two main reasons. The first reason – that is consistent with the criticism
made by those associated with the American left – is that this model leads to the
displacement of the politics of distribution by politics of identity. This is
done, according to Fraser, either by those who “simply ignore” distributive
issues and exert efforts to changing the culture, or by those who believe that
“maledistribution is merely a secondary effect of
misrecognition”, and want to rectify this problem.[4][4] In either case, Fraser argues, the identity model of
the politics of recognition is misguided, since it severely compromises the
concern of male-distribution.
The second reason – consistent with postmodern and
poststructuralist approaches – is that the identity model leads to the
reification and essentialization of cultural
identities. This, in turn, formidably confines individuals within cultural
communities. “Stressing the need,” Fraser says, “to elaborate and display an
authentic, self-affirming and self-generated collective identity, it puts moral
pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture”.[5][5] The
reification of culture is a problem that carries special significance to
cultural groups that maintain hierarchies between their members such as between
men and women or between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews
in the case of Israeli Jewish society. Thus, emphasizing the significance of
culture may result in providing moral support to discriminatory practices
against women.[6][6]
In view of the problems plaguing the identity model of
the politics of recognition, the status model appears to provide better
solutions to inequalities figuring a strong connection between the inferior
socioeconomic status of certain members of society and their cultural
distinctiveness. Thus, this model suggests that the required form of
recognition they need is the one allowing them to participate as full and equal
members in the social life, that is; allowing them to
enter relationship with others on equal grounds. The desired form of
recognition then is not the one intended to rectify group identity but to
secure the equal status of all individuals as full participants in social
relationship. That is, the status model is concerned with the lifting of the
obstacles put in front of them, obstacles resulting from their either ascribed
or constructed distinctiveness. The status model of the politics of recognition
aspires to bring about a situation in which the social status of individuals is
not effected by this distinctiveness.
Following this approach, it means that the identity
model of recognition is replaced with the status model. This model, Fraser argues,
is “not committed a priori to any one type of remedy for misrecognition;
rather, it allows for a range of possibilities, depending on what precisely the
subordinated parities need in order to be able to participate as peers in
social life”.[7][7]
Fraser’s reservations about the identity model receive
attention in the work of those who share these reservations but emphasize,
nonetheless, the significance of cultural identity as a principle of political
action. They endorse the anti-essentialist point but reject the possibility
that social groups can be identified on the basis of either of clear and
distinct disposition, may they be inborn or acquired. They nonetheless support
political action based on collective identity as an important and necessary
tool for social change. Actually, they endorse Spivak’s
idea of “strategic essentialism”[8][8] and Appadurai’s idea of
“structured primoridalism”.[9][9] That is, parallel to their acknowledgement that
collective identities are “socially constructed” and occasionally harmful, they
believe that there are good reasons why sometimes they should nonetheless be
constructed. The construction of such identities may provide social groups who
face various forms of oppression with the symbolic and material wherewithal
needed to initiate meaningful social change.
In contrast to these somewhat reserved approaches
towards collective identities, there are other thinkers who maintain more
favorable attitudes towards collective identities. This is, then, the maximal
approach. Supporters of this approach
argue that collective identities and cultural communities are crucially
important to the development of human beings. Communitarians such as Sandel and Taylor argue that individuals cannot form their
personal identities independently of a given community and its values.[10][10] Individuals, they add, learns
about themselves and consolidate their identity only in a community in which
they are embedded and from which they derive their values and what is
meaningful in life.
Although not espousing an essentialist position with
respect to cultural communities and collective identities as
Independently of the ontological status of cultural
identities, Kymlicka distinguishes between three
kinds of collective rights: rights to self-government, polyethnic
rights, and representative rights. The aim of these rights – that are
consistent with universal principles – is to protect minority groups from the
political and economic power of society in large, while each kind is intended
to deal with one kind of constraint.[12][12] These rights, however, presuppose that every
political framework carries – either implicitly or explicitly – a distinct
collective and cultural identity. That is, the demand to secure some of the
rights come up on the assumption that the cultural and collective identity is
an integral part of every polity - there is no polity that lacks
collective identity.
Self-government
rights: These rights secure a considerable measure of autonomy to certain
cultural groups. The provision of self-government rights are intended to ensure
these groups “the full and free development of their cultures and the best
interests of their people”.[13][13] These rights concern “societal cultures,” namely
cultures that “provide their respective members “meaningful ways of life across
the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres”.[14][14] Indigenous and national minorities are the typical
examples of the groups who are entitled, according to Kymlicka,
to these rights.
Polyethnic rights: these rights intend to protect specific
religious and cultural practices which might not be adequately supported
through the market… or which are disadvantaged… by existing legislation”.[15][15] The polyethnic rights are
provided to groups that do not display the feature characterizing societal
cultures, such as immigrant groups. These groups, Kymlicka
argues, consist of individuals who voluntarily immigrated to the country of
their choice and they struggle mainly for their right to assimilate into
society as full and equal members. The polyethnic
rights are intended therefore to facilitate this process. They intended, as Kymlicka argues, “to help ethnic groups and religious
minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering
their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant
society”.[16][16]
Representative rights: these rights are intended to
provide representative rights to ethnic or national minorities within political
institutions so that their interests are not compromised by decision-making
political processes.[17][17] (Unlike self-government and polyethnic
rights, representative rights are considered as temporary measures aiming to
compensate for systematic discrimination resulting from under- representation
of various groups in society, i.e., “ethnic and racial minorities, women, the
poor and the disabled”.[18][18] One of the obvious forms of representative rights is
manifested in the policies of affirmative programs.[19][19]
It should be noted that the distinction
Kymlicka makes between the different types of rights
is not endorsed by all. Critics of Kymlicka believe
that these distinctions are too rigid.[20][20] The main thrust of the criticism is
directed against the manner he defines those groups entitled to polyethnic rights – immigrant groups. His critics argue
that it is not accurate to view all immigrants as individuals who voluntarily
join the receiving society and want to assimilate within it. Immigration, they
say, is often a traumatic experience forced upon individuals and hence cannot
be perceived as an act of choice exerted under optimal conditions. Many
immigrants are willing to immigrate to any society that is willing to take them
in or to any society displaying the provide them with
a shelter protecting them form political persecution, economic distress, or
natural disasters. Therefore, their immigration to this or that country does
not indicate their readiness to relinquish their culture. In view of these considerations, it is
questionable whether the rights to self-government should be reserved only to
indigenous national minorities. Thus, for instance, it is possible to imagine
providing Turkish minorities in
Who is right and who is wrong? What
form should multiculturalism take? Should we opt for a status model of the
politics of recognition, or for the identity model? In what cases should we
bestow self-government rights and the other kinds of rights? Now, the pronoun
‘we’ should not be understood universally. That is, there is no universal point
of view that can assist us in categorically determining the validity of, for
instance, the identity versus the status model of the politics of recognition.
Similarly, and contra Kymlicka, one cannot determine a
priori that self-government rights are bestowed only on indigenous national
minorities. As stated, although such minorities often present clear cases when
the status of their members as free and equal human beings can be guaranteed by
endowing them with such rights (on top of other rights), it is not clear that
self-government rights are not sometimes required to secure this status to
immigrant communities. Thus, for instance, the fact that ultraorthodox
Jews constitute an immigrant community in the
2.
Multiculturalism in
What are the implications of multiculturalism to
Israeli society and its “basic structure”? As stated, in answering this
question I will focus on the Palestinian/Jewish divide, the
religious/non-religious divide, the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi
divide, the gender divide and the veteran/immigrant divide. Broadly speaking,
these divides yield different solutions, making different use of the three
types of group rights suggested by Kymlicka. That is,
while the Palestinian divide and the religious/secular divide requires
Multiculturalism in Separate Public Spaces (MSPS), the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi
divide and the gender divide requires Multiculturalism in Common Public Spaces
(MCPS).
The distinction between the MSPS model and the MCPS
model is not definitive. But in contrast to the MCPS model, the MSPS typically
involves the demand of minority groups to be granted self-government rights,
which, in turn, require the establishment of separate arrangements and
institutions. Thus, the MSPS model may require, for instance, the establishment
or reinforcement of segregated neighborhoods and towns, separate educational
streams (that use the language of minority groups and develop a curriculum
emphasizing the culture and history of each group) and separate media
institutions (e.g., TV’s and radio’s channels). Similar arrangements may be
also required in other fields of art (film, theatre, etc.,) and even in the
economic fields where novel initiatives are needed in order to boost
minorities’ economic development.
In contrast to the MSPS, the MCPS model involves polyethnic and representative rights. The main concern of
these rights is that the cultures of various minority groups and their
histories are integrated within the common public spaces. The groups who
advance the multicultural demands that accord with this model do not wish to
establish their own segregated communities. Rather, they argue that that
society at large misrecognized them and their respective cultures and hence
encourages the creation of formal and informal obstacles that impede their full
and equal integration in society. The cultural demands that accord with the
MCPS model amount to, as Kymlicka would describe it,
temporary measures aiming to secure equal and full participation of minority
groups in society. This, however, should not mislead us to underrate the value
of the cultural demands that accord with the MCPS model, for the integration of
the culture and history of minority groups may often entail considerable
revisions of the culture and history of society.
3. Multiculturalism and Separate
Public Spaces:
The Jewish-Palestinian Divide
In many respects, the Palestinian/Jewish divide is
the most rigid of all divides characterizing Israeli society. The Israeli
Palestinians constitute an indigenous national minority that once was a
majority within the territorial borders of
The second consociational
arrangement suggests that
Anyhow, those supporting the more extensive
bi-national arrangement argue that the prospect of two separate states is
anyway becoming difficult to realize due to the following two main reasons.
First, demographically speaking, it becomes ever difficult to secure either a
Jewish homogenous nation-state or a Palestinian homogenous nation-state due to
the existence of a sizable Palestinian national minority living within Israel’s
1948 borders and due to the increase in the number of the Jewish settlements
and settlers in the occupied territories (especially in the West Bank). Second,
the Jewish and Palestinian populations are spread over a limited territory that
shares the same ecological system that requires closely joint efforts to manage
and control it. Third, Palestinian society is greatly dependent on Israeli
economy, sharing, for instance, the same labor market. Thus, not instituting a
bi-national arrangement, the implementation of the two-state solution will lead
to the political and economic subordination of the
In any case, the demand to grant Palestinians cultural
and national autonomy (while neutralizing
The Palestinian quest for self-government rights – in
one form or another – should be examined against the concerns raised in the
previous section about the problems associated with the politics of
recognition. These rights, no doubt, entail some form of an identity model of
the politics of recognition. That is, they include the Palestinians' rights to
manage their educational and cultural affairs, intending to preserve and
cultivate Palestinian cultural identity. Can we say, therefore, that the demand
to satisfy these rights involves “the problem of displacement” and the “problem
of reification”? That is, can we say that the demand to satisfy them emphasizes
issues of identity at the cost of ignoring issues of distribution? Furthermore,
to what extent this demand confines individuals within rigid collectivities?
In fact, when we ponder these questions we see that no
simple answer can be given to them. More importantly, we also see why it is
impossible to make a clear-cut distinction between the identity model and the
status model. Let us examine these issues closely by looking first at the
context in which Palestinians’ demand for self-government rights come about.
First, the Palestinians constitute a national group that began to form in the
1830’s.[30][30] Now, like all national groups, the Palestinian
national group is no doubt an ‘imagined community’ that involved selective
interpretation of history and the fabrication of primordial past and myths.[31][31] But this does not change the reality and facticity of Palestinian collective identity, as much as
the use of the same methods does not change the reality and facticity
of other national identities. Kymlicka’s words on
this issue are right on the mark. “Much has made,” writes Kymlicka,
“in the recent literature of the social construction of national identity, and
of the invention of tradition. And of course much of the mythology accompanying
national identities is just that – a myth. But it is important not to confuse
the heroes, history, or present-day characteristics of a national identity with
the underlying national identity itself. The former is much more malleable than
the latter”.[32][32]
National identities do indeed involve a considerable
measure of reification and maybe should be transcended, but it is unreasonable
and unfair to demand of national minorities to relinquish ‘their’ national
identity while they constitute oppressed minorities within states (e.g.,
The struggle against the various forms of oppression
shows that the identity and the status models are often inextricably
intertwined. That is, strengthening and solidifying group identity is sometimes
a necessary means for a successful struggle for equal status in society. There
are no short cuts in this regard. That is to say, the prospect of transforming
The Religion/non-Religion Divide
Although quite different in nature, the option of a consociational, multicultural democracy seems also to be an
adequate solution, mutatis mutandis, to the relationship that should
hold between religious and non-religious groups. Granting religious groups with
cultural autonomy that accord with the MSPS, they should be able, with the
assistance of the state, to maintain their unique way of life. That is, they
are granted the right to a separate educational system and the right to control
the public sphere of their segregated communities.[36][36] As we saw, unlike the analogous
demand in the case of the Jewish/Palestinian divide, these rights are fully
met, with one major exception. While recognizing the equal right of all groups
to religious autonomy, non-Jewish religious institutions are severely
discriminated, as stated, in the allocation of material resources. [37][37]
The provision of cultural autonomy to
religious groups leaves an important issue unresolved. Religious groups may
argue that alone, this arrangement works in favor of the dominant groups
because it leaves no room for religious groups to participate in shaping the
character of the common public spaces.[38][38] This disadvantage, they might
continue, cannot be justified especially when a state displays no neutrality
towards the different cultures existing within it. Thus, they may demand that
they be allowed to partake in shaping the character of the common public spaces
by incorporating religious elements in them. And indeed, this is the demand
that Jewish religious leaders make against the State of Israel. They state that
they recognize the right of non-observant Jews to lead their private life as
they wish but demand that the public sphere carry the hallmark of Jewish
religion. “The practical and positive attitude of the ultra-orthodox Judaism to
the State of Israel,” state Rabbi Shtookhammer, the
former secretary of the ultra orthodox religious party, Agudat
The demand of
ultra-orthodox Jews that the public sphere of
Given what they see as excessive intrusion
of religion into
However, the self-government rights
granted to religious groups yield uncomfortable results when assessed against
the reservations Fraser voices about the identity model of the politics of
recognition. It seems that her claims that the demands of
religious groups to be granted self-government rights involves the
shortcomings Fraser associates with this model. Thus, for instance, one can
hardly deny that the demand of ultra-religious groups to be granted
self-government rights that protect their unique way of life indicates a
flagrant and willing repudiation of the politics of distribution on behalf of
the politics of identity. Following a critical theme against the politics of
identity,[42][42] it is possible to say that the protection of this way
of life is crucially detrimental to the well being of the members of
ultra-orthodox groups. It does not encourage the development of the capacities
and competence of their members needed to exploit the opportunities for
economic improvement and self-realization offered by Israeli society. That is,
ultra orthodox religious values and codes of behavior put religious individuals
in a disadvantageous position in Israeli society. Although some may argue that
this criticism presupposes a system belief dominating post-industrial
capitalist societies and reflecting bourgeoisie ethos and values, they cannot
easily dismiss it such as this. They cannot ignore the fact, for instance, that
the rate of members of ultra-orthodox groups living under poverty line is
extremely high.[43][43] One cannot, then, convincingly justify abject poverty
by appealing to cultural norms and ideals.
Things get, however, more complicated
when we recognize that the protection of the way of life embraced by members of
ultra-orthodox religious groups does not touch merely on the question whether
the state can or cannot interfere with it in order to increase their life
chances. As things stand, the protection of this way of life requires generous
material assistance provided by the state, which, in turn, played a crucial
role in its expansion among the members of these groups. Hence, should not the
state create negative incentives in order to encourage them to seek economic
independence? Should not the state create such incentives in order to mitigate
the threat posed to its welfare system by the allocation of generous welfare
benefits to citizens who incline to be part of its working force? The
multicultural position I advance suggests that the state is within its right to
act in this manner. I believe, however, that many ultra-orthodox Jews and their
leaders understand that the state cannot continue to provide this assistance
and they make first attempts to integrate actively within
Viewed form a multicultural perspective,
the way of life embraced by ultra-orthodox groups involves another major
problem. This problem is also associated with the provision of self-government
rights to religious groups; namely, the problem of the reification of culture.
As we saw, the problem is that minority groups often use these rights to impose
oppressive codes of behavior on some of their members. As Kymlicka
emphasizes, (liberal) multiculturalism rejects such practices and condemns
them. But he – as well as other multiculturalists – does not offer a systematic
way as how to handle such practices.[45][45]
Compared with the difficulties posed by religious
groups to the possible implementation of the ideal of multicultural democracy,
its implications for other segments of society are much easier to accommodate.
I have in mind women, Mizrahi Jews, and new
immigrants, mainly from former Soviet republics and from
Implementing the ideal of
multicultural democracy regarding these groups would require mainly revisions
of symbolic institutions and public practices that underpin the various forms
of exclusion, discrimination and marginalization directed against them. Thus,
the implementation of the ideal of multicultural democracy in the case of these
groups can be facilitated by granting them mainly polyethnic
and representative rights. On some occasions, however, this ideal can also be
facilitated by granting them quasi-self-government rights.
Gender Relations and the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi
Divide
As far as the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi
divide and the gender divide go, it is generally the case that the oppressed
groups (Mizrahim and women) do not call for the
establishment of segregated communities. The main concern of these groups is to
curtail the discriminatory practices that are mediated through cultural
misrecognition of their members. Thus, on the one hand, there are the forceful
claims that
The struggle of women and Mizrahim
bear strong similarities since both groups, as stated, seek the rectification
of their group identity as one of the necessary means to participate in social
life as full and equal members.[51][51] As stated, these groups do not wish
to establish segregated communities but want to bring changes in the very
hegemonic culture. The desired changes cannot be dismissed as a trifle. In the
case of Mizrahi Jews it may, first, call for a new
narration of the common and troubled Mizrahi/Ashkenazi
past; and second, it may require the incorporation Mizrahi
historical and cultural heritage (that does not fall squarely within the
strictures of Zionist logic) into
Similar revisions in the national culture are required
in the case of women. “Do women,” asks Herzog, “have interests qua women”?[53][53] Rightly, Herzog does not give a straight answer to
this question, for it is highly controversial. Reviewing, however, some of the
work written by Israeli women on gender and gender inequality it becomes clear,
more or less, that most of them favor strategies and are committed to causes
that may secure women equal and full participation in society. Thus it is
mainly a combination of a struggle to uproot preconceptions that degrade women
and confine them to inferior social status and a demand to grant women
representative rights in the political arena and in the public job market
(e.g., affirmative action programs aiming to increase the ratio of women in
these fields). Furthermore, as Friedman notes, the quiet “gender revolution” of
the last two decades has taken place mainly in home-based politics, challenging
patriarchal hegemony and achieving a considerable equality between the sexes.[54][54] This orientation mirrors the effect that women
authors have on
Although completely different form the
two schisms dealt with before, also the present schisms (the Mizrahi/Ashkenazi schism and the women/ men schism) do not
permit an easy severance between claims of recognition and claims of
distribution. That is, the fact that most Mizrahi
Jews and women seek full and equal integration within society, does not mean
that they relinquish claims of recognition. Thus, even those matters that
seemingly touch solely on issues of recognition tend to have distributive
ramifications. This is the case, for instance, concerning the demand that the
“nation’s collective memory” incorporates the unique role that Mizrahi Jews and women had played during
Russian Immigration: Multicultural Challenges in a
Global Era
In
comparison with the Mizrahim and women, immigrants
from the former soviet unions present a different multicultural challenge to
Israeli society. First, It should be noted that the
integration of the Russian immigrants to Israeli society has not been
accompanied by a strict adoption of the Israeli and Hebrew culture.[58][58] This explains in part the fact that the Russian
community has developed a vibrant literal industry producing books, newspapers
and journals. In the beginning of the last decade the distribution of all these
publications has reached the mark of one million: four national newspapers,
nine local newspapers, twelve weekly magazines, one children magazine, and five
periodicals dealing with culture and literature. Not only constructing Israeli
reality differently than Hebrew literal industry, this industry also challenges
the boundaries of
What is the appropriate way to
accommodate the need of Russian immigrants to maintain their cultural identity?
What is the way to transform the de facto multiculturalism displayed in
the relationship between the Russian immigrants and Israeli society into de jure multiculturalism? Does this de facto multiculturalism
require self-government rights or only polyethnic and
representative rights? Do the Russian immigrants, as Kymlicka
would have argued, constitute a group that wants to assimilate within Israeli
society and hence should be denied self-government rights? I believe that it is
impossible to provide a straightforward answer in favor of Kymlicka’s
position in this regard. While maintaining their unique cultural identity, most
immigrants from the former
Ethiopian Immigration: Multiculturalism and the new Challenge of Race
A more complicated case, however, is the status of
Ethiopian immigrants in